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Abstract
A recent line of research has developed around logics of belief based on information
confirmed by a reliable source. In this paper, we provide a finer analysis and extension
of this framework, where the confirmation comes from multiple possibly conflicting
sources and is of a probabilistic nature. We combine Belnap-Dunn logic and non-
standard probabilities to account for potentially contradictory information within a
two-layer modal logical framework to account for belief. The bottom layer is to be
that of evidence represented by probabilistic information provided by sources available
to an agent. The modalities connecting the bottom layer to the top layer, are that
of belief of the agent based on the information from the sources in terms of (various
kinds of) aggregation. The top layer is to be the logic of thus formed beliefs.
Keywords: epistemic logics, non-standard probabilities, Belnap-Dunn logic,
two-layer modal logic.
1 Introduction
As we collect and process more and more data to form beliefs about the world,
we are faced with information from multiple sources of different origins, that
is mostly incomplete and often conflicting concerning the issues we wish to
resolve. In this context, we wish to formalize how an agent can build its belief
from the available collected data. The information typically is of a probabilistic
nature however, simply confusing (degrees of) belief of a rational agent with a
subjective probability, rather than analysing how beliefs are formed based on
such probabilistic information coming from multiple sources, would not do.
Context and state of the art. A recent line of research has developed
around epistemic logics based on information or evidence [4,6]. In particular,
Bı´lkova´ et al. [6] understand belief as based on information confirmed by a
reliable source. However, the nature of information and of sources on which
such belief is founded, their reliability, and the way belief is formed, remained
somewhat undeveloped. In this paper we follow up on these ideas and present
a framework where the information about potentially complex and not fully
1 The research of Marta B´ılkova´ was supported by the grant GA17-04630S of the Czech
Science Foundation. The research of Sabine Frittella and Sajad Nazari was funded by the
grant ANR JCJC 2019, project PRELAP (ANR-19-CE48-0006). The research of Ondrej
Majer was supported by the grant GA16-15621S.
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determined facts comes from multiple possibly conflicting sources and is of a
probabilistic nature.
Case studies. We introduce two case studies that we use through out the
article to illustrate the different concepts at stake.
Case 1 (Aggregating heterogeneous data) A company has to launch a
new car and needs to decide its selling price and its advertising strategy. Hence,
its data analysts must study the reports on the sells of the previous products
launched by the company and the success or failure of the advertisement cam-
paigns. This study relies on factual information such as “during the year 2015,
the company sold n items of product Y ”, but also on statement based on statis-
tical analyses such as “the advertisement broadcasted in June 2016 increased
the sells of product Y among the 20-30 years old of 30%”. The second state-
ment is based on aggregated information about the buyers that might be partial
and partly false. Plus, the company has access to statistical studies about the
population on increase or decrease in expenses for cars.
Case 2 (How to lead an investigation) An investigator needs to know if
one of the suspects was present at the crime scene. She collects information
from various sources (CCTV camera recordings, ATM logs, witnesses’ state-
ments etc.). No information of this kind is absolutely precise and typically
different sources of information contradict each other. Sources provide infor-
mation of a probabilistic nature (e.g. witnesses are not absolutely sure what
they have seen). Moreover, the pieces of evidence confirming investigator’s hy-
pothesis (the suspect was present at the place of crime) are different from, and
somewhat independent of, those rejecting it (there is a CCTV camera closed
to the crime scene vs. ATM in a supermarket in a different city). A lack of
evidence supporting the suspect was present at the crime scene does not yield
a proof she was not there. In the end, the investigator has to aggregate the
available information and form some beliefs about what likely happened.
In Case 1, the agent trying to build an opinion about the launching strategy for
the new car has access to a huge amount of heterogeneous, more or less reliable
information. However, this agent (the team of data analysts and marketing) has
computational abilities one can assume to be unlimited. In Case 2, even though
the investigator can be seen as an expert, she can only analyse and combine a
limited amount of information in a (computationally) simple manner.
Belnap-Dunn logic. There are several proposals of logical frameworks in
the literature allowing for (non-trivial) inconsistencies. Belnap-Dunn logic BD
(also referred as First Degree Entailment) was specifically designed to deal with
(possibly) incomplete and inconsistent information one can find in databases
(see Section 2.2 and [5]). This task is accomplished by extending the set of
truth values. In BD a formula might not only be true (t) or false (f) as in the
classical case, but can also be neither (n) or both (b). 2
2 The reading of truth values is not metaphysical, they are interpreted from the point of
view of available information.
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Non-standard probabilities. One of the background assumptions behind
the BD approach is that positive and negative information are distinct. Having
information about truth of a proposition ϕ is distinct from the information
about its falsity. This assumption is naturally applicable in the probabilistic
framework. We will distinguish positive probability p+ of a claim ϕ repre-
senting (probabilistic) information supporting ϕ and negative probability of ϕ
representing (probabilistic) information rejecting ϕ. Non-standard probabili-
ties of this kind have been discussed in the literature, we introduce them in
Section 2.3 following the presentation given in [16].
Two-layer modal logics. In order to take into account all such considera-
tions, we will combine BD logic and non-standard probabilities to account for
potentially contradictory information about events, within a two-layer modal
logical framework (see [3] and Section 4) to account for belief. The bottom
layer is to be that of events or facts representing probabilistic information pro-
vided by sources available to an agent. The modalities connecting the bottom
layer to the top layer encode the belief of the agent (e.g. about an event taking
place) based on the information from the sources in terms of (various kinds of)
aggregation. The top layer is the logic of thus formed beliefs.
Structure of the paper. First, in Section 2, we give technical preliminaries
on the logic BD and non-standard probabilities. Then, in Section 3, we discuss
the possible aggregation strategies depending on the type of agent one models.
In Section 4, we present two-layer modal logics and provide examples. Finally,
in Section 5, we discuss further lines of research.
2 Preliminaries
This section contains the necessary technicalities on algebraic structures
(namely certain product bilattices, residuated bilattices and MV algebras) and
logics (namely BD logic and two logics derived from  Lukasiewicz logic) used
in the framework, and finally non-standard probabilities. For more details,
the reader can refer to [18,15] for bilattices, [5,11] and [17] for BD logic and
de Morgan algebras, [10] for  Lukasiewicz logic and MV algebras, and [16] for
non-standard probabilities.
2.1 Some bilattices and MV algebras
Semantically, many-valued logics mostly use algebras of truth values which are
lattices, where the lattice order is a truth order. An underlying idea of Belnap-
Dunn four-valued logic [5] is that not only amount of truth, but also amount of
information that each of the values carries matters. The idea was generalized by
Ginsberg [13], where he introduced the notion of bilattices, which are algebraic
structures that contain two partial orders simultaneously: a truth order, and a
knowledge (or an information) order.
Definition 2.1 A bilattice is an algebra B = (B,∧,∨,⊓,⊔,¬) such that the
reducts (B,∧,∨) and (B,⊓,⊔) are both lattices and the negation ¬ is a unary
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Fig. 1. The bilattice 2⊙ 2 (left), Dunn-Belnap square 4 (middle), and its continuous
probabilistic extension (right).
operation satisfying that for every a, b ∈ B,
if a ≤t b then ¬b ≤t ¬a, if a ≤k b then ¬a ≤k ¬b, a = ¬¬a,
with ≤t (resp. ≤k) the order on (B,∧,∨) (resp. (B,⊓,⊔)) called the truth
(resp. knowledge or information) order. A bilattice is interlaced if each one of
the four operations ∧, ∨, ⊓, ⊔ is monotone w.r.t. both orders ≤t and ≤k.
Bilattices form a variety, the class of interlaced bilattices is also a varie-
ty. Given an arbitrary lattice L = (L,∧L,∨L), we can construct the product
bilattice L⊙L = (L×L,∧,∨,⊓,⊔,¬) as follows: for all (a1, a2), (b1, b2) ∈ L×L,
(a1, a2) ∧ (b1, b2) := (a1 ∧L b1, a2 ∨L b2) (a1, a2) ∨ (b1, b2) := (a1 ∨L b1, a2 ∧L b2)
(a1, a2) ⊓ (b1, b2) := (a1 ∧L b1, a2 ∧L b2) (a1, a2) ⊔ (b1, b2) := (a1 ∨L b1, a2 ∨L b2)
¬(a1, a2) := (a2, a1) (a1, a2) ≤t (b1, b2) iff a1 ≤ b1 and b2 ≤ a1
L ⊙ L is always an interlaced bilattice, and any interlaced bilattice can be
represented as a product billatice: a bilattice B is interlaced if and only if
there is a lattice L such that B ∼= L⊙ L [2].
Example 2.2 The smallest interlaced bilattice is the product bilattice of the
two-element lattice 2 ⊙ 2 (Figure 1 left). It is isomorphic to Dunn-Belnap
square 4 used as an algebra of truth values for Belnap-Dunn logic (Figure 1
middle). Moreover it is a de Morgan algebra, and it generates the class of de
Morgan algebras as a quasivariety.
Example 2.3 A probabilistic extension of Dunn-Belnap square can be seen as
based on the product bilattice L[0,1] ⊙ L[0,1] with L[0,1] = ([0, 1],min,max).
Definition 2.4 A residuated lattice is an algebra L = (L,∧L,∨L, ·, \, /) such
that the reduct (L,∧L,∨L) is a lattice, (L, ·) is a semi-group (i.e. the operation
· is associative) and the following residuation properties hold: for all a, b, c ∈ L,
a · b ≤ c iff b ≤ a \ c iff a ≤ c/b.
Example 2.5 The standard algebra of  Lukasiewicz logic [0, 1] L =
([0, 1],∧,∨,& L,→ L) is a residuated lattice, an MV algebra, and it generates the
variety of MV algebras. As & L is commutative, the two implications coincide.
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For all a, b ∈ [0, 1], we define a negation ∼ La := a → L 0 := 1 − a, and the
standard operations
a ∧ b := min{a, b}, a& Lb := max{0, a+ b− 1},
a ∨ b := max{a, b}, a→ L b := min{1, 1− a+ b)}.
[0, 1]op L = ([0, 1]
op,∨,∧,⊕ L,⊖ L) arises turning the standard algebra upside
down, and is isomorphic to the original one. Here, we have ∼ La := 1⊖ L a,
a⊕ L b ≈ ∼a→ L b = min{1, a+ b} a⊖ L b ≈ ∼(a→ L b) = max{0, a− b}.
Finally, we will consider the MV algebra [0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L = ([0, 1] ×
[0, 1]op,∧,∨,&,→) with operations defined pointwise, in particular ∧ and ∨
are defined as in bilattices, ∼(a1, a2) := a→ (0, 1) = (∼a1,∼a2), and:
(a1, a2)&(b1, b2) := (a1& Lb1, a2 ⊕ L b2)
(a1, a2)→ (b1, b2) := (a1 → L b1, b2 ⊖ L a2) = (a1 → L b1,∼a2& Lb2).
As both the projections are surjective homomorphisms of MV algebras, this
algebra also generates the variety of MV algebras.
Definition 2.6 [15] Given a residuated lattice L = (L,∧L,∨L, ·, \, /) the pro-
duct residuated bilattice L⊙L = (L×L,∧,∨,⊓,⊔,⊃,⊂,¬) is defined as follows:
the reduct (L×L,∧,∨,⊓,⊔) is the product bilattice (L,∧L,∨L)⊙ (L,∧L,∨L)
and, for all (a1, a2), (b1, b2) ∈ L× L,
(a1, a2) ⊃ (b1, b2) := (a1 \ b1, b2 · a1) and (a1, a2) ⊂ (b1, b2) := (a1/b1, b1 · a2).
Given a product residuated bilattice, one can define the following operations:
for all a, b ∈ L× L,
a→ b := (a ⊃ b) ∧ (¬a ⊂ ¬b), a← b := ¬a→ ¬b, and a ∗ b := ¬(b→ ¬a).
For any product residuated bilattice, the structure (L×L,∧,∨, ∗,→,←,¬)
is a residuated bilattice endowed with an involutive negation. If · is commuta-
tive (associative), so is ∗.
Example 2.7 The product residuated bilattice [0, 1] L ⊙ [0, 1] L = ([0, 1] ×
[0, 1],∧,∨,⊓,⊔,⊃,¬, (0, 0)) with [0, 1] L = ([0, 1],∧,∨,& L,→ L, 0) being the
standard MV algebra of  Lukasiewicz logic amounts to the following:
(a1, a2) ∗ (b1, b2) := (a1& Lb1, (a1 → L b2) ∧ (b1 → L a2))
(a1, a2)→ (b1, b2) := ((a1 → L b1) ∧ (b2 → L a2), a1& Lb2),
and (1, 1) acts as the unit of the ∗: (1, 1) ∗ a = a ∗ (1, 1) = (1, 1). 3 We define
∼a := (a ⊃ (0, 0)) ⊔ ¬(¬a ⊃ (0, 0)) = (∼ La1,∼ La2)
a⊕ b := (∼a ⊃ b) ⊔ ¬(∼¬a ⊃ ¬b) = (a1 ⊕ L b1, a2 ⊕ L b2)
a⊖ b := ∼(a ⊃ b) ⊓ ¬∼(¬a ⊃ ¬b) = (a1 ⊖ L b1, a2 ⊖ L b2).
3 Definitions of →, ∗ match those used in [9] for interval based fuzzy logics, under a trans-
formation given by (x1, x2) 7→ (x1, 1− x2) (symmetry across the (0, 0.5)(1, 0.5) line).
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From [15], we know that the (isomorphic copies of) product residuated bilat-
tices obtained from MV algebras form a variety, and its axiomatization can be
obtained by translating the one of MV algebras (in the language of residuated
lattices) 4 .
2.2 Logics
Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic BD. This logic evaluates formulas to
Belnap-Dunn square – a lattice built over an extended set of truth values
{t, f, b, n} (Figure 1, middle). Alternatively (cf. Example 2.2) we can see
BD square as the bilattice 4 (Figure 1, left). We take the language of LBD
to be built from a (countable) set of propositional variables Prop using con-
nectives {∧,∨,¬}, an evaluation e : Prop → 4 is extended to all formulas
in the standard way. The consequence relation of logic BD is given, based
on the logical matrix (4, F ) with F = {t, b}) being the designated values, as
Γ BD ϕ iff ∀e (e[Γ] ⊆ F → e(ϕ) ∈ F ).
A frame semantics can also be given for BD, in two ways. Belnap-Dunn four-
valued frame is a couple 〈W,4〉 and the corresponding model as 〈W,4, e〉 where
W is a set of states and e is a valuation of atomic formulas e : Prop×W → 4.
The valuation is extended to formulas of LBD using the algebraic operations
on 4 in the expected way. Alternatively, following Dunns’ approach [11], we
can define a Belnap-Dunn double valuation model M = 〈W, v+, v−〉, with two
atomic valuations (a positive and a negative one) v+, v− : W × Prop→ {0, 1}
which we extend to two satisfaction relations +,− on formulas of LBD:
s + ¬ϕ iff s − ϕ, s + ϕ ∧ ψ iff s + ϕ and s + ψ,
s − ¬ϕ iff s + ϕ, s − ϕ ∧ ψ iff s − ϕ or s − ψ.
Where s ∈ W and ϕ, ψ are formulas of LBD containing only conjunction and
negation. Disjunction can be defined as: ϕ ∨ ψ := ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). The two
approaches yield equivalent semantics for BD (see Appendix 6.1). We can speak
about a positive (resp. negative) extension of a formula ϕ which is the set of
states which positively (resp. negatively) support it : ||ϕ||+ = {s ∈W | s + ϕ}
(resp. ||ϕ||− = {s ∈ W | s − ϕ}). The frame semantics is dual to the matrix
one, and yields the same logic when satisfaction and entailment in the double
valuation models are defined in the usual way using the positive satisfaction
relation, yielding Γ BD ϕ iff ∀M, s (s 
+ Γ→ s + ϕ). BD can be completely
axiomatized using the following axioms and rules:
ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ϕ ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ ϕ ⊢ ψ ∨ ϕ ϕ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ¬¬ϕ ¬¬ϕ ⊢ ϕ ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ) ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ)
ϕ ⊢ ψ, ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ ψ, ϕ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ ψ ∧ χ
ϕ ⊢ χ, ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
¬ψ ⊢ ¬ϕ
BD logic is known to be (strongly) complete w.r.t. frame semantics mentioned
4 [15] hints at the correspondence between subvarieties of residuated lattices and residuated
bilattices being categorial. This would mean that the mentioned variety is in fact generated
by the product bilattice of the standard MV algebra. One could then use the translation
from [15] to obtain axiomatics of the logic in Example 2.11.
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above, and w.r.t. (4, {t, b}), and therefore also w.r.t. (L[0,1]⊙L[0,1], {(1, a) | a ∈
[0, 1]}) because it has (4, {(1, 0), (1, 1)}) as a sub-matrix 5 . BD is also known
to be locally finite 6 .
BD was specifically introduced to process possibly incomplete or inconsis-
tent information one can find in databases. Hence, one understands why we
use it to model Case 1. However, BD appears to be useful in many other situa-
tions. Indeed, computers are not the only ones having to deal with this kind of
situation. For instance, the investigator in Case 2 is interviewing eye-witnesses
to know if they saw the suspect at the crime scene. She ends up with four kind
of answers: “yes”, “no”, “I don’t know”, “maybe, I think so, but it could have
been someone else”. We use BD mainly to capture the underlying information
states on which sources of probabilistic information are based in Section 3.
Two logics derived from  Lukasiewicz logic. We aim at a logic to reason
about beliefs of an agent, some of which preserve the properties of non standard
probabilities. We need enough expressivity to capture the probabilistic axioms
explained in the next section — this motivates choosing  Lukasiewicz logic as a
starting point, as it naturally expresses plus and minus.
Example 2.8 [An extension of  Lukasiewicz logic.] We first consider the
MV algebra [0, 1] L×[0, 1]
op
 L = ([0, 1]×[0, 1]
op,∧,∨,&,→) from Example 2.5. We
consider only (1, 0) to be the designated value. Its logic (understood as the set
of theorems - formulas always evaluated at (1, 0), or as a consequence relation -
preserving the value (1, 0)) - is  Lukasiewicz logic  L. It can be axiomatized in the
(complete) language {→,∼} by axioms of weakening, suffixing, commutativity
of disjunction, and contraposition, and the rule of Modus Ponens. We will
extend the signature of the algebra with the bilattice negation ¬(a1, a2) =
(a2, a1), and extend the language to {→,∼,¬} (in particular, ⊕ and ⊖ can be
defined similarly as in Example 2.5). Together we obtain the following axioms
and rules, denoting the resulting consequence relation ⊢ L(¬) (we will call the
three axioms on the right ¬-axioms):
α→ (β → α) ¬¬α↔ α
(α→ β)→ ((β → γ)→ (α→ γ)) ¬∼α↔ ∼¬α
((α→ β)→ β)→ ((β → α)→ α) (∼¬α→ ∼¬β)↔ ∼¬(α → β)
(∼β → ∼α)→ (α→ β) α, α→ β/β α/∼¬α
Using the ¬ axioms, one can prove that the ¬ negations can be pushed to the
atomic formulas, and consider formulas up to provable equivalence in a negation
normal form (nnf), i.e. formulas built using {→,∼} from literals of the form
p,¬p. We denote ⊡Γ := ∼¬Γ ∪ Γ.
5 The obvious embedding is a strict homomorphism of de Morgan matrices - it preserves
and reflects the filters
6 The inter-derivability relation of the axiom system is a Frege congruence. Local finiteness
means there are only finitely many (up to inter-derivability) formulas in a fixed finite set of
propositional variables.
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Lemma 2.9 For any finite set of formulas Γ, α in a nnf,
Γ ⊢ L(¬) α iff for some finite ∆, ⊡Γ,∆ ⊢ L α,
where ∆ contains instances of ¬-axioms.
Lemma 2.9, proved in Appendix 6.3, provides a translation to provability
in  L and allows us to see that the extension of  L by ¬ is conservative. Now,
using finite completeness of  L, we can see (Appendix 6.4) that  L(¬) is complete
w.r.t. [0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L :
Lemma 2.10 (Finite strong completeness) For a finite set of formulas Γ,
Γ ⊢ L(¬) α iff ∀e : L → [0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L (e[Γ] ⊆ {(1, 0)} → e(α) = (1, 0)).
Example 2.11 [A bilattice logic of [0, 1] L ⊙ [0, 1] L] Last, we look at the
residuated bilattice [0, 1] L ⊙ [0, 1] L = ([0, 1] × [0, 1],∧,∨,⊓,⊔,⊃,¬, (0, 0)) of
Example 2.7. We consider it as a matrix with F = {(1, a) | a ∈ [0, 1]} being
the designated values. We consider formulas in the language consisting of
{∧,∨,⊓,⊔,⊃,¬, 0}, and evaluations in [0, 1] L⊙ [0, 1] L that in particular send 0
to (0, 0), ⊤,⊥, ∗,→,∼,⊕,⊖ are definable (see Example 2.7 and Appendix 6.6).
The consequence relation is defined as Γ  L⊙ L α iff ∀e(e[Γ] ⊆ F → e(α) ∈ F ).
2.3 Non-standard probabilities
The idea of independence of positive and negative information naturally gene-
ralizes to probabilistic extensions of BD logic. We start with the notion of a
probabilistic Belnap-Dunn (BD) model, which is a double valuation BD model
extended with a classical probability measure on the power set of states P (W )
generated by a mass function on the set of states W . 7
Definition 2.12 A probabilistic BD model is a tuple M = 〈W, v+, v−,m〉,
such that 〈W, v+, v−〉 is a BD model and m : W → [0, 1],
∑
s∈W m(s) = 1 is a
mass function on the set of states.
We define a non-standard (positive) probability of a formula as a (classical)
measure of its positive extension: p+(ϕ) :=
∑
s∈||ϕ||+ m(s). We can define a
non-standard negative probability in a similar way. It is shown in [16, Lemma
1], that non-standard probability satisfies the following axioms.
Theorem 2.13 Let M = 〈W, v+, v−,m〉 be a probabilistic BD frame. Then
the non-standard probability function p+ induced by m satisfies:
(A1) normalization 0 ≤ p+(ϕ) ≤ 1
(A2) monotonicity if ϕ BD ψ then p
+(ϕ) ≤ p+(ψ)
(A3) import-export p+(ϕ ∧ ψ) + p+(ϕ ∨ ψ) = p+(ϕ) + p+(ψ).
where BD is the entailment of BD logic and ϕ, ψ ∈ LBD,
Since positive and negative non-standard probabilities are mutually defin-
able via negation: p−(ϕ) = p+(¬ϕ), it suffices to use just p+.These axioms are
weaker than classical Kolmogorovian ones. In particular additivity does not
7 The probability of a set X ⊆W is defined as the sum of masses of its elements.
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hold and is replaced by A3. As a consequence, p+(¬ϕ) 6= 1− p+(ϕ) in general,
but only p+(ϕ ∧¬ϕ) + p+(ϕ∨ ¬ϕ) = p+(ϕ) + p+(¬ϕ) holds. This admits pos-
itive non-standard probability of (classical) contradictions (0 < p+(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ))
and hence allows for a non-trivial treatment of inconsistent information.
We can diagrammatically represent non-standard probabilities on a con-
tinuous extension of Belnap-Dunn square (Figure 1, right), which we can see
as a product bilattice L[0,1] ⊙ L[0,1] (cf. Example 2.3). In this diagram each
point corresponds to a pair (p+(ϕ), p−(ϕ)) representing positive and negative
probabilistic support of a formula ϕ. So the point (0, 0) correponds to the situ-
ation when no information concerning ϕ is available, while (1, 1) is the point
of maximally conflicting information. The vertical dashed line corresponds to
the ”classsical” case when positive and negative support sum up to 1.
Example 2.14 [Case 2. The eye-witnesses] Our investigator interviewed
four witnesses. If witness 2 affirms with absolute certainty that she did not see
the suspect, then it is making the statement that p(φ) = (0, 1). If witness 2 says
“I am confident with 80% that I saw this man, but I might be wrong with 20%”,
then it is making the statement that p(φ) = (0.8, 0.2). One can observe that this
probability is a point on the vertical line (representing classical probabilities)
of the probabilistic extension of the Belnap-Dunn square (Figure 1).
Now, if our investigator interviews a witness to know the character of the
suspect (here the husband) and his relationship with the victim. He asks “Did
they have a happy marriage?” and the witness answers “I think so, because
they really seemed to love each other and their kids, but at the same time he
was working long hours and travelling a lot for work and she was feeling lonely”.
The investigator may interpret this both as a piece of information supporting
the fact the husband did not kill his wife and as a piece of information suggesting
he might have a motive: p(φ) = (0.8, 0.4).
Example 2.15 [Case 1. Consulting a panel] The company assembles a
panel to which they ask whether a word describes the car well or not. That
is, they ask how much they agree with the statements: “the car has property
φ (e.g. being a family car)?” and “the car does not have property φ?” If
humans were classical agents, every person would answer with a probability p
that belongs to the vertical line of the probabilistic extension of the Belnap-
Dunn square. However, experience has shown that often people don’t reason
classically [1]. If a person answers (p+(φ), p−(φ)) with p+(φ)+p−(φ) < 1, then
she is not conflicted about whether the property φ describes the car, however
there might be some uncertainty on how to judge whether the car has property
φ. If a person answers (p+(φ), p−(φ)) with p+(φ) + p−(φ) > 1, then she is
conflicted about whether the property φ describes the car.
3 Aggregating inconsistent probabilistic information
In this section, we consider an agent that (i) considers a set of topics listed by
the atomic variables in Prop, (ii) has access to sources giving information within
the framework of non-standard probabilities and (iii) builds beliefs based on
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these sources using a so-called aggregation strategy (Definition 3.1). We focus
on cases where the agent has no prior beliefs about the topics at stake. For
instance, in Case 2, the investigator is called on a new crime scene, collects
evidence and, only after he has collected enough evidence, tries to build a
theory about what happened.
Definition 3.1 A source s is a non-standard probability assignment over the
set of formulas s : LBD → [0, 1] × [0, 1]. An aggregation strategy Agg is a
function that takes in input a set of sources S = {si}i∈I and returns a map
AggS : LBD → [0, 1] × [0, 1]. For every ϕ ∈ LBD, we denote AggS(ϕ)
+ (resp.
AggS(ϕ)
−) the positive (resp. negative) support assigned to ϕ.
Depending on the context, the aggregation strategy should satisfy different
properties.
Definition 3.2 Let Agg be an aggregation strategy and S be a set of sources.
Agg is monotone if ϕ ⊢ ψ implies AggS(ϕ) ≤ AggS(ψ) for all ϕ, ψ ∈ LBD and for
every S. Agg is ¬-compatible if AggS(ϕ)
− = AggS(¬ϕ)
+ for every ϕ ∈ LBD and
for every S. Agg preserves non-standard probabilities if AggS is a non-standard
probability for every S.
Many aggregation strategies have been introduced on classical probabilities.
Some strategies such as the (weighted) average can be straight forwardly gen-
eralized to non-standard probabilities. On belief functions, Dempster-Shafer
combination rule [19] allows to combine possibly conflicting beliefs proceeding
from multiple independent sources. It has been generalized from Boolean al-
gebras to distributive lattices [20] and arbitrary finite lattices [12]. Intuitively,
the combined belief highlights the converging portions of evidence, and down-
plays the conflicting ones. However, in situations of high conflicts between
the sources, it provides counter intuitive results. In the following, we present
aggregation strategies for our two case studies.
Example 3.3 [Case 1. Weighted average] A company has access to a huge
amount of heterogeneous data from various sources and to software to analyse
these data. Hence, it makes sense to consider potentially “computationally
difficult” aggregation methods that preserve non-standard probabilities. A
very natural proposal is to grade every source si with respect to its reliability
wi and to take the weighted average of the probabilities. The aggregation is
then the map WA : LBD → [0, 1]× [0, 1] such that, for every ϕ ∈ LBD,
WA+(ϕ) :=
∑
1≤i≤n wi · p
+
i (ϕ)∑
1≤i≤n wi
and WA−(ϕ) :=
∑
1≤i≤n wi · p
−
i (ϕ)∑
1≤i≤n wi
.
One can easily prove that WA is a non-standard probability. This aggregation
strategy is not feasible when modelling human reasoning. In what follows, we
propose more realistic aggregations for that situation.
Example 3.4 [Case 2. A very cautious investigator] The investigator
builds her opinion on the suspect based on different sources. We assume all
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the sources are equally reliable and the investigator does not want to draw
conclusions hastily. Hence, she relies only on statements all her sources agree
on. The aggregation is then the map Min : LBD → [0, 1]× [0, 1] such that
Min(ϕ) := ⊓1≤i≤n pi(ϕ) =
(
min
1≤i≤n
p+i (ϕ), min
1≤i≤n
p−i (ϕ)
)
.
Example 3.5 [Case 2. Reasoning with trusted sources] Here, we assume
all the sources are perfectly reliable. Hence, the investigator builds her belief
on every statements supported by at least one source. The aggregation is then
the map Max : LBD → [0, 1]× [0, 1] such that
Max(ϕ) := ⊔1≤i≤n pi(ϕ) =
(
max
1≤i≤n
p+i (ϕ), max
1≤i≤n
p−i (ϕ)
)
.
Here, one has high chances of reaching contradiction. In a scientific analyses, if
one gets experiments or information that is contradictory, there are two options.
Either the information is incorrect or there is a mistake in the interpretation of
the data. Here, if the sources are 100% reliable, reaching a contradiction state
will simply indicate to our investigator that there is a flaw in her analysis of
the problem and she needs to change perspective to resolve the conflict.
4 Two layer logics
To make a clear distinction between the logical level of information on which
the agent bases her beliefs, and the level of reasoning about her beliefs, we use
a two layer logical framework. The formalism originated with Ha´jek [14], and
was further developed in [8] and [3] into an abstract framework with a general
theory of syntax, semantics and completeness.
Syntax (Le,Lu,M) of a two layer logic L consists of a lower language Le,
an upper language Lu, and a set of modalities M. We concentrate on unary
modalities in this paper: we propose logics of belief of a single agent. Non-
modal formulas of the lower language are defined over a (fixed countable) set
Prop of propositional variables using connectives of Le in a standard way.
Whenever ♥ ∈ M is a modality and ϕ is a non-modal formula of Le, then
♥(ϕ) is a modal atomic formula of Lu. Given modal atomic formulas, modal
formulas of Lu are formed using connectives of Lu in a standard way.
Semantics of a two layer logic L is based on frames of the form
F = (W, 〈Es〉s∈W , U, 〈µ
♥〉♥∈M), µ
♥ :
∏
s∈W Es → U,
whereW is a set of states, Es are local algebras of evaluation in the states, U is
an upper-level algebra, and for each modality ♥ ∈M, its semantics is given by
the map µ♥ 8 . A model M is given by a frame F together with a collection of
valuations 〈es〉s∈W of the non-modal formulas in algebras Es. Thus, for a non-
modal formula, we have ϕM = 〈es(ϕ)〉s∈W ∈
∏
s∈W Es. For an atomic modal
8 For this paper, we always consider the lower algebras be all the same. But different algebras
can be later used when modelling heterogeneous information. We write algebras, but often
we use matrices, i.e. algebras with a set of designated values.
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formula, we have ♥(ϕ)M = µ♥(ϕM ) ∈ U. The upper level is then interpreted in
the algebra U in the usual way: for a connective c ∈ Lu and modal formulas αi,
c(α1, . . . , αm)
M = cU (αM1 , . . . , α
M
m ). A non-modal formula is said to be valid
in a model if its value in all the states s ∈ W is designated in Es. A modal
formula is said to be valid if its value in U is designated. Validity in a frame is
defined in the usual way as validity in all the models over the frame.
The resulting logic as an axiomatic system L = (Le,M,Lu) consists of an
axiomatics of Le, modal axioms and rulesM , and an axiomatics of Lu. We say
that F is: Ke-based if algebras Es are in the class of algebrasKe, Ku-measured
if U is in the class Ku, and a frame for L if it validates each axiom of M and
for each rule fromM , we have that the frame validates its conclusion whenever
it validates all the assumptions. From [8, Theorems 1 and 2] we can extract
the following completeness results 9 :
- If Le is (finitely) strongly complete w.r.t. Ke and Lu is strongly com-
plete w.r.t. Ku, then L is (finitely) strongly complete w.r.t. Ke-based Ku-
measured frames for L,
- If Le is finitely strongly complete w.r.t. Ke and locally finite, M finite, and
Lu is finitely strongly complete w.r.t.Ku, then L is finitely strongly complete
w.r.t. Ke-based Ku-measured frames for L.
Example 4.1 [Probabilistic belief ] Consider a two layer logic with Le =
{∧,∨,¬} language of BD, M = {B} a belief modality, Lu = {→,∼,¬} of Ex-
ample 2.8. The intended frames are F = (W,4, [0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L , µ
B) where µB
is computed as follows. A source is given by a mass function on the states m :
W → [0, 1]. Given e ∈
∏
v∈W 4, µ
B computes the sums of weights over states
with positive/negative support: µB(e) = (
∑
ev∈{t,b}
m(v),
∑
ev∈{f,b}
m(v)).
Thus, for a non-modal formula ϕ, we obtain its non-standard positive and
negative probabilities 10
B(ϕ)M = (
∑
v+ϕm(v),
∑
v−ϕm(v)) = (p
+(ϕ), p−(ϕ)).
The bottom layer is that of events or facts, represented by BD-information
states, and Le is BD. The source gives probabilistic information resulting from a
mass function on the states. The modality is that of non-standard probabilistic
belief, the top layer Lu =  L(¬) is to be the logic of thus formed beliefs. The
modal part M consists of axioms and a rule reflecting the axioms of non-
standard probabilities:
B(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (Bϕ⊖B(ϕ ∧ ψ))⊕Bψ B¬ϕ↔ ¬Bϕ
ϕ ⊢BD ψ/ ⊢ L(¬) Bϕ→ Bψ
The resulting logic is (BD,M,  L(¬)). As BD is locally finite and strongly com-
plete w.r.t. 4, and  L(¬) is finitely strongly complete w.r.t. [0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L by
Lemma 2.10, we conclude that
9 In a recent survey paper this is contained in [3, Theorems 3 and 4].
10We can see the upper layer of the semantics as providing a belief state of a single agent.
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Lemma 4.2 (BD,M,  L(¬)) is finitely strongly complete w.r.t. 4 based,
[0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L -measured frames validating M .
In such frames, µB interpretsB as a non-standard probability (see Appendix
6.6). From [16, Theorem 4], we know that it is the induced non-standard
probability function of exactly one mass function on the BD states, which in
fact yields completeness w.r.t. the intended frames described above. Since the
(weighted) average aggregation yields a non-standard probability (see Example
3.3), (BD,M,  L(¬)) is also adequate to capture frames withmultiple sources and
such that µB : P (
∏
s∈W 4)→ [0, 1] L× [0, 1]
op
 L computes the (weighted) average
of the probabilities given by the individual sources 11 .
Alternatively, we can take Lu = {∧,∨,⊓,⊔,⊂,¬, 0} as the language of the
residuated bilattice [0, 1] L ⊙ [0, 1] L of Examples 2.7 and 2.11. The intended
frames are F = (W,4, [0, 1] L⊙ [0, 1] L, µ
B), with µB defined as above and inter-
preting belief as a non-standard probability. We can define ⊕,⊖ as described
in Example 2.11, and use literally the same modal axioms M as above.
Example 4.3 [Monotone coherent belief ] The intended frames are F =
(W,4,L[0,1] ⊙ L[0,1], µ
B) where L[0,1] ⊙ L[0,1] is the bilattice of Example 2.3,
we have multiple sources and µB : P (
∏
s∈W 4) → L[0,1] ⊙ L[0,1] computes the
min (max) aggregation of the probabilities given by the individual sources, see
Examples 3.4 and 3.5. In general this does not yield a non-standard proba-
bility, only the interdefinability of positive and negative support via negation
is preserved. This motivates considering logic (BD,M,BD), where the modal
part M consists of the axiom and rule 12
B¬ϕ ⊣⊢BDu ¬Bϕ ϕ ⊢BDe ψ/Bϕ ⊢BDu Bψ.
As BD is strongly complete w.r.t. both 4 and L[0,1] ⊙ L[0,1], we obtain that
(BD,M,BD) is strongly complete w.r.t. 4-based L[0,1]⊙L[0,1]-measured frames
validating M 13 .
5 Conclusion and future research
We lay the foundations for a modular framework to model reasoning with
inconsistent probabilistic heterogeneous information. We build on the two layer
logical framework presented in [3]. The lower language models the sources and
the upper language models the beliefs of the agent. The sources’ inconsistent
probabilistic information is formalized via non-standard probabilities and the
agent belief is interpreted on the product algebra [0, 1] L× [0, 1]
op
 L , or a product
bilattice [0, 1]⊙ [0, 1]. This framework can be used to model case studies both
11 In case we weight the sources in [0, 1], µB : [0, 1]
∏
s
4
→ [0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L .
12We wish to stress the distinction between the lower logic BDe and the upper logic BDu
even though they are the same, only operating in different languages.
13This kind of generic completeness however provides counterexamples with a single 4-valued
state (and a single belief state), which are not quite the intended semantics involving multiple
states and sources.
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in data analyses and in human reasoning. This article is the first step in a long
term research project, future research directions include:
Aggregation strategies. In Section 3, we present three aggregation strate-
gies: the weighted average WA, a cautious aggregation Min using only the
information all sources agree upon, and a trustful aggregation Max using all
the available information. While WA relies on the agent having strong com-
putational abilities and evaluating the reliability of the sources, Min and Max
rely on the epistemic attitude of the agent. Another natural aggregation stra-
tegy would be to adapt Demspter-Shafer (DS) combination rule. We wish to
investigate the link between belief functions and non-standard probabilities. In
addition, DS combination rule is problematic in cases of high conflict and pro-
vides counter intuitive results. Generalizing DS combination rule to BD should
provide a mathematical environment where high conflict can be handled in a
more intuitive manner.
Modelling the sources. Very often, a source does not give an opinion about
each formula of the language. Hence, one needs a framework able to account
for sources giving partial probability maps. In addition, the sources’ reasoning
might be based on different logical principles. One source might reason clas-
sically, while another one might use a very weak logic and refuse (or not be
able) to give an opinion about complex statements. This raises further ques-
tions of which logic(s) one should use to model sources. Another quest is to
capture dynamics of belief given by updates on the level of sources (e.g. adding
a source).
Modelling the agent. As for the sources, one needs to pick the appropriate
logic to model the agent. In Case 1, one assumes the agent has strong com-
putational abilities, hence a logic such as relevant logic might be adequate. In
Case 2, we might want to use a weaker logic that takes into account the human
limitation of the investigator. In addition, the bilattice framework provides us
with many options to define alternative notions of conjunction (for instance,
the bilattice meet ⊓ for ≤k or a lifting of the fusion on [0, 1] to the bilattice),
implication and negation. What would be the significance of these connectives
in that framework?
From single to multiple agents. Once we understand the single agent case,
it is only natural to generalize the framework to the multi agent setting, in-
volving group modalities and dynamics of belief. Specifically, forming group
belief, including common and distributed belief, will involve communication
and/or sharing and pooling of sources. It might also call for a use of modalities
inside the upper logic to account for reflected beliefs, in contrast to the beliefs
grounded directly in the sources.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Two frame semantics for BD.
The two kind of frames for BD mentioned in Subsection 2.2 yield equivalent
semantics for BD. They are related as follows:
e(ϕ, s) = t iff s + ϕ and s 1− ϕ,
e(ϕ, s) = b iff s + ϕ and s − ϕ,
e(ϕ, s) = n iff s 1+ ϕ and s 1− ϕ,
e(ϕ, s) = f iff s 1+ ϕ and s − ϕ.
6.2 Negative normal form in  L(¬)
Each formula of the language of  L(¬) is equivalent to a formula in a ¬-negation
normal form, i.e. ¬ occurs only (at most once) in front of atoms. It is easy
to see, because we have ¬∼α ↔ ∼¬α and ¬(α → β) ↔ ∼∼¬(α → β) ↔
∼(∼¬α → ∼¬β) provable. A procedure can be defined which turns each α
into α¬ in nnf, so that we can prove, by induction, that (∼α)¬ ↔ ∼α¬ and
(α→ β)¬ ↔ ∼(∼α¬ → ∼β¬).
6.3 Proof of Lemma 2.9
We need to prove that for any finite set of formulas Γ, α in a nnf,
Γ ⊢ L(¬) α iff for some finite ∆, ⊡Γ,∆ ⊢ L α,
where ∆ contains instances of ¬-axioms, and ⊡Γ = Γ ∪∼¬Γ.
The right-left direction is trivial -  L is a subsystem of  L(¬), and all the
axioms in ∆ are provable in  L(¬), and, thanks to the ∼¬-rule, Γ ⊢ L(¬) ⊡γ for
each γ ∈ Γ.
For the other direction, we proceed in a few steps. First, we denote by
⊢ L(¬)− provability in  L(¬) without the ∼¬-rule. By routine induction on proofs
(and using that ∼¬ distributes from/to implications and negations), we can see
that
Γ ⊢ L(¬) α iff ⊡Γ ⊢ L(¬)− α.
Then, clearly, we can list all the instances of ¬-axioms in the proof in ∆, and
obtain:
⊡Γ ⊢ L(¬)− α iff ⊡Γ,∆ ⊢ L α.
First, note that we can list in ∆ all instances of ¬-axioms for all subformulas
of Γ, α as well and still keep the Lemma valid. This will come handy in the
following proof. Second, we stress that in the final proof ⊡Γ,∆ ⊢ L α in  L, we
still use language of  L(¬), where formulas starting with ¬ are seen from the
point of view of  L as atomic.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 2.10
We need to prove that for a finite set of formulas Γ
Γ ⊢ L(¬) α iff ∀e : L → [0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L (e[Γ] ⊆ {(1, 0)} → e(α) = (1, 0)).
The left - right direction is soundness, and consists of checking that the axioms
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are valid and the rules sound. We only do some cases:
First the ∼¬-rule: assume that e is given and e(α) = (1, 0). Then e(∼¬α) =
∼¬(1, 0) = ∼(0, 1) = (1, 0).
Next, for any e, e(∼¬(α → β)) = ∼¬(e(α) → e(β)) = ∼¬(e(α)1 → L
e(β)1,∼ L(e(β)2 → L e(α)2)) = ((e(β)2 → L e(α)2),∼ L(e(α)1 → L e(β)1)),
and, e(∼¬α → ∼¬β) = ∼¬e(α) → ∼¬e(β) = (∼ Le(α)2,∼ Le(α)1) →
(∼ Le(β)2,∼ Le(β)1) = (∼ Le(α)2 → L ∼ Le(β)2, e(α)1& L∼ Le(β)1) = ((e(β)2 → L
e(α)2),∼ L(e(α)1 → L e(β)1)).
Last, for any e, e(¬∼α) = ¬∼e(α) = (∼ Le(α)2,∼ Le(α)1) = ∼¬e(α) =
e(∼¬α).
For the other direction, let us assume that Γ 0 L(¬) α. Then for some
finite ∆ containing instances of ¬-axioms (in particular those for subformulas
of Γ, α), we have ⊡Γ,∆ 0 L α. Because  L is finitely standard complete, there
is an evaluation e : At → [0, 1] L sending all formulas in ⊡Γ,∆ to 1, while
e(α) < 1. Here, At contains literals from Γ, α of the form p,¬p, and atoms and
formulas of the form ¬δ from ⊡Γ,∆. We define e′ : Prop→ [0, 1] L× [0, 1]
op
 L by
e′(p) = (e(p), e(¬p)). We can then prove, by routine induction, that for each
formula e′(β) = (e(β), e(β¬)). We use the fact that e[∆] ⊆ {1}, and ∆ contains
all instances of ¬-axioms for all subformulas of Γ, α.
We now immediately see that e′(α) < (1, 0), because e(α) < 1. To prove
that indeed e′[Γ] ⊆ {(1, 0)}, we use the fact that e[⊡Γ] ⊆ {1}: as for all γ ∈ Γ,
e(∼¬γ) = 1, e(¬γ) = e(γ¬) = 0. For the latter, we again need to use the fact
that e[∆] ⊆ {1}, and ∆ contains all instances of ¬-axioms for all subformulas
of Γ, as they prove, by means of  L, that ¬γ ↔ γ¬, and e has to respect that.
Now we conclude, that for all γ ∈ Γ, e′(γ) = (e(γ), e(γ¬)) = (1, 0).
6.5 Logic of Example 2.11
We consider formulas in the language consisting of {∧,∨,⊓,⊔,⊃,¬, 0}, and
evaluations in the matrix ([0, 1] L ⊙ [0, 1] L, F ) with F = {(1, a) | a ∈ [0, 1]},
that in particular send 0 to (0, 0). The constants and connectives ⊤,⊥, 1, ∗,→
,∼,⊕,⊖ are definable as follows:
∼α := (α ⊃ 0) ⊔ ¬(¬α ⊃ 0) ⊤ := 0 ⊃ 0 ⊥ := ¬⊤ 1 := ∼0
α→ β := (α ⊃ β) ∧ (¬β ⊃ ¬α) α⊕ β := (∼α ⊃ β) ⊔ ¬(∼¬α ⊃ ¬β)
α ∗ β := ¬(β → ¬α) α⊖ β := ∼(α ⊃ β) ⊔ ¬∼(¬α ⊃ ¬β)
For an evaluation e, it holds that e(α → β) ∈ F iff e(α → β) ≥t (1, 1) iff
e(α) ≤t e(β).
6.6 Example 4.1
We have proved that (BD,M,  L(¬)) is finitely strongly complete w.r.t. 4 based,
[0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L -measured frames validating M . In such frames, µ
B interprets
belief B as a non-standard probability: recall the axioms and rule in M are
B(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (Bϕ⊖B(ϕ ∧ ψ))⊕Bψ B¬ϕ↔ ¬Bϕ
ϕ ⊢BD ψ/ ⊢ L(¬) Bϕ→ Bψ
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For a frame to validate the axioms means they are sent to (1, 0), by an evalu-
ation in [0, 1] L × [0, 1]
op
 L induced by µ
B over the lower state valuations (which
determines values of modal atomic formulas). An equivalence α ↔ β is eval-
uated at (1, 0) iff the values of α and β are equal. B(ϕ)M = µB(ϕM ) =
(p+(ϕ), p−(ϕ)). Therefore, the first two axioms say that
p+(ϕ ∨ ψ) = (p+(ϕ)− p+(ϕ ∧ ψ)) + p+(ψ) and p+(¬ϕ) = ¬p−(ϕ)
p−(ϕ ∨ ψ) = (p−(ϕ)− p−(ϕ ∧ ψ)) + p−(ψ) and p−(¬ϕ) = ¬p+(ϕ).
Similarly, the fact that the frame validates the rule say that p+ (p−) are mono-
tone (antitone) w.r.t. ϕ ⊢BD ψ. Analogous observation holds for the case the
upper logic is the bilattice one of Example 2.11.
